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WHISTLEBLOWERS: CORPORATE ANARCHISTS
OR HEROES? TOWARDS A JUDICIAL
PERSPECTIVE
David Culp'

This article explores the whistleblower's plight.' Inside the corporation, everyone, or almost everyone, hates them. They are reviled by
corporatemanagement andshunned by co-workers. This articleexamines whether the legal system adequatelyprotects whistleblowers and
delineates the direction the law should take to safeguardthem while at
the same timeprotect companies againstmalicious or badfaith actions
by disgruntledemployees.

I. THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH - DISASTER IN THE EMERALD CITY
We all know the story. On January 28, 1986, in sub-freezing
weather, the space shuttle Challenger began its lift-off from the Kennedy
Space Center and exploded just seventy-three seconds into its flight,
killing all seven astronauts trapped inside the inferno.2 The Rogers
Commission, formed to investigate the disaster, concluded that the
explosion occurred due to the seal failure of a solid rocket booster joint.3
The death of the astronauts should never have happened. Morton
Thiokol, Inc. ("Morton Thiokol"), the company that manufactured solid
fuel rocket boosters for the space shuttle program including those used
on the Challenger,4 had previously warned the National Aeronautics and

* B.S., Kansas University, 1964; J.D., Kansas University School of Law, 1969; LL.M.,
Columbia University School of Law, 1975. Assistant Professor and Director of Pre-Law Program,
La Salle University. Member, Berry and Culp, P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. A whistleblower, or to blow the whistle, is to report or inform on. WEBSTER'S NEw
WORLD DICTIONARY 1621 (2d ed. 1980).
2. Russell P. Boisjoly et. al., Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical
Dimensions, 8 J.Bus. ETHics 217 (1989) [hereinafter Boisjoly].
3. Id.
4. Patricia H. Werhane, Engineersand Management: The Challenge of the ChallengerIncident, 10 . BUS. ETics 605 (1991) [hereinafter Werhane].
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Space Administration ("NASA") of the dangers of a cold weather
launch.' Data from previous launches indicated that the rubbery O-rings
designed to seal the boosters' segments lost their resiliency with a
decrease in temperature. At low temperatures, the rings could lose so
much resiliency that one could fail to seal properly causing a mid-flight
shuttle explosion. 6
On January 28, 1986, due to sub-freezing
temperatures, an O-ring on the Challenger did not seal properly, releasing
gases from the burning fuel propellant.7 Moments later the Challenger
exploded in mid-takeoff, and seven lives were lost.'
Engineers at Morton Thiokol knew the danger of O-rings failing to
seal properly in cold weather flights. In July of 1985, six months prior
to the Challenger disaster, Roger Boisjoly, an engineer and Senior Scientist at Morton Thiokol with over 25 years of experience and an
acknowledged rocket seal expert,9 wrote a memorandum to his superiors
expressing extreme urgency and concern that unless the solid rocket
booster joints were redesigned, a space shuttle disaster involving the loss
of human life could result.'°
Although Morton Thiokol did form a "Seal Erosion Task Force"
to investigate the reasons for O-ring failure, the booster joints were never
redesigned. By January 1986, Thiokol's engineers "had become particularly concerned [because] it was evident that the behavior of the
rubber 0-ring material could not be accurately predicted when temperatures dropped below thirty degrees."'" The ideal temperature to
ensure O-ring integrity was fifty degrees. 3
On the night of January 27, 1986, as the Space Shuttle Challenger
sat on its launch pad in sub-freezing weather, NASA officials conferred
in teleconferences with Morton Thiokol managers regarding the safety of
the launch the following morning. 4 The forecast for the lift-off was
eighteen degrees.'
Boisjoly and other engineers argued against the

5. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 218-21.
6. Michael Davis, Thinking like an Engineer: The Place ofa Code ofEthics in the Practice
of a Profession, 20 PHIL. AND PuB. AFF. 150, 151 (1991).

7. See Werhane, supra note 4, at 605-09.
8. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 217.

9. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 217. Boisjoly is also an acknowledged rocket seal expert with
over 25 years experience in the field. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 219.
10. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 219-20.

11. Boisioly, supra note 2, at 220.
12. Werhane, supra note 4, at 606.

13. Werhane, supra note 4, at 606.
14. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 221.
15. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 221.
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launch, presenting thirteen charts and other evidence from previous space
flights to show the effects of primary O-ring erosion and the difficulty
in maintaining a reliable secondary seal as the temperatures dropped. 6
Initially, two Morton Thiokol vice-presidents supported their
engineers and recommended that the launch be aborted. 7 NASA
officials, however, began pressuring Morton Thiokol management to
recommend launching the Challenger. George Hardy, Deputy Director
of Science and Engineering at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center,
stated that he was "appalled" at the recommendation not to launch. 8
Sensing an attempt would be made to overturn the no-launch decision,
Boisjoly again argued of the dangers of a cold weather launch, displaying
photos of compromised joints from previous flights.'9
Despite the efforts of Boisjoly and other engineers, four Morton
Thiokol vice-presidents, including the two who had initially recommended against the launch, met briefly and voted unanimously to support the
launch?' The decision to launch so upset Boisjoly that he returned to
his office and made the following entry in his journal: "I sincerely hope
this launch does not result in a catastrophe."''
On the morning of January 28, 1986, in sub-freezing weather, the
Space Shuttle Challenger burst into flames shortly after lift-off and
exploded?2 After the disaster, project supervisor Allen McDonald and
Boisjoly "blew the whistle" on Morton Thiokol and testified before the
Rogers Commission about their protestations against the launch? 3
During interviews with two members of the Rogers Commission,
Boisjoly turned over his memoranda and activity reports concerning the
launch and O-ring integrity! 4 Almost immediately thereafter, Morton
Thiokol reorganized its booster design operations and placed McDonald,
Boisjoly, and others involved in the O-ring project out of direct contact
with NASA? 5 Although no engineer had been fired nor demoted, this
was a realignment of retaliatory proportions? 6

16. Boisoly, supra note 2, at 221.

17. Those being Joel C. Kilminster, Vice President of Space Booster Programs and LK. (Bob)
Lund, Vice President of Engineering. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 221.
18. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 221.
19. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 221-22.
20. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 221-22.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 223.
Werhane, supra note 4, at 607.
Werbane, supra note 4, at 606.
Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 223.
Werhane, supra note 4, at 606-07.
See Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 223; Werhane, supra note 4, at 606-07.
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Prior to testifying in a closed session before the Rogers Commission, Boisjoly was chastised by Ed Garrison, President of Aerospace
Operations for Morton Thiokol, for "airing the company's dirty laundry"
by giving his memos to the Commission.2 7 At the hearing, Boisjoly
testified about his change in job responsibilities.2 This testimony
prompted a sharp response from Commission Chairman Rogers who
rebuked Thiokol management:
Mf it appears that you're punishing the two people or at least two of
the people who are right about the decision and objected to the
launch... and then they're demoted or feel that they are being
retaliated against, that is a very serious matter. It would seem to
me... they should be promoted, not demoted or pushed aside.29
Nevertheless, despite the Commissioner's rebuke, according to Boisjoly,
on May 16, 1986, the CEO of Morton Thiokol told McDonald and
Boisjoly that the company was doing "just fine" until they testified about
their job reassignments2 0
Although Congressional pressure eventually led to the restoration of
both McDonald and Boisjoly to their former assignments, 31 a major rift
had developed within the corporation.3 2 Some co-workers believed
Boisjoly's testimony had hurt the company's image, 33 and co-workers
sometimes described those who protested against the launch as "lepers. 3 4 Boisjoly and the others had become pariahs. Boisjoly's
emotional anguish following the Challenger disaster and its aftermath
became so great that he eventually requested long-term disability leave
for stress-related conditions. 5
If. THE WHISTLEBLOWER'S PLIGHT

The experiences of Boisjoly and McDonald as whistleblowers are
not unique. Reviled by management and shunned by co-workers,

27.
28.
29.
30.

Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 223.
Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 223.
Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 223.
Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 223.

31. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 223.
32. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 223.
33. Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 223.
34. GEORGE A. STEINER & JOHN F. STERNER, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY: A
MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE, TEXT AND CASES, 510-11 (7th ed. 1994).
35. Id.; see also Boisjoly, supra note 2, at 223.
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"[T]he history of
whistleblowers face a lonely existence.
whistleblowersi... [is that most] have been fired, blackballed from their
industry or profession, and have suffered personal problems."36 In
fighting the retaliatory acts of their employers, they have incurred
tremendous legal expenses which, when coupled with the loss of earnings
resulting from termination, have resulted in disastrous financial
Many whistleblowers have lost their homes and
consequences?'
marriages as a direct result of their concern for the public health and
welfare. 38 A recent study of eighty-four whistleblowers revealed that
82% experienced harassment after blowing the whistle, 60% were fired,
17% lost their homes, and 10% admitted to attempted suicide. 9
There is no shortage of stories to confirm as a general rule that the
whistleblower's fate has been rather bleak. Whether an individual is a
coal miner or a noted scientist, the consequences of blowing the whistle
can be equally disastrous. The experiences of Darla Baker and Judith
Watts are examples of the consequences of whistleblowing.
Darla Baker, a West Virginia coal miner, accused her company of
condoning sexual harassment at the worksite.40 After making her
complaint, Ms. Baker was subjected to a vicious attack on her moral
character and an inquisition into her sexual behavior by the coal
company's defense counsel. 4 ' Although the case was eventually settled
in her favor, Baker's marriage deteriorated during the trial and she
believes she was blackballed from the industry.42 Reflecting on the
be as heroic in the fature, given
incident, Baker doubts that she4 would
3
experience.
this
of
outcome
the
Judith Watts was a supervisor at the Department of Finance in New
Orleans when she uncovered a scheme in which many local businesses
gave kickbacks to politicians and bureaucrats in exchange for overlooking the collection of taxes.
Watts attempted to pursue this matter

36. Werhane, supra note 4, at 615.
37. Lynne Dumas, Blowing the 9hfstle, WOhMN'S DAY, Nov. 24, 1992, at 62.

38. Andrew W. Singer, Pathotor Bounty Hunter,ACROSS THE BOARD, Nov. 1992, at 16, 21.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Dumas, supra note 37, at 67.

41. Dumas, supra note 37, at 67.
42. Dumas, supra note 37, at 67. Ms. Baker believed this because she was unable to find work
in any other mines, even those where the "quota" of women had not been fulfilled. Dumas, supra
note 37, at 67.

43. Dumas, supra note 37, at 67. Ms. Baker stated "lit would depend on the circumstances.
It changed my life so drastically, that, well, I just don't know:' Dumas, supra note 37, at 67.
44. Dumas, supra note 37, at 62.
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through the proper internal channels and was rebuffed by her superiors.45 Watts' supervisors told her to overlook these improprieties

because no action was to be taken against certain companies that had lent
support to the local administration. 46 With internal channels closed,
Watts turned her information over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBr') 7 Months later, this information was published in the newspa-

per and "all hell broke loose" for Watts.4 The publication of this information brought about her terminatioii and what this author believes was
a "trumped-up" grand jury proceeding, in which all charges were
subsequently dropped.4 9 Although she was later reinstated, Watts was

reassigned to a position "out of the loop, 5 just as McDonald and
Boisjoly were given reassignments "out of the loop" with NASA. 5 '
Watts subsequently resigned after her reassignment.5 2
There are numerous other accounts of the whistleblower's plight. 3
Stated simply, whistleblowers are considered disloyal to their companies
and treated as outcasts by fellow employees. This author recently settled
a whistleblower case in the nuclear industry in which the employee

45. Dumas, supra note 37, at 64.
46. Dumas, supra note 37, at 63-64.
47. Dumas, supra note 37, at 63-64.
48. Dumas, supra note 37, at 64.
49. Dumas, supra note 37, at 64.
50. Dumas, supra note 37, at 64.
51. Werhane, supra note 4, at 606-07.
52. Dumas, supra note 37, at 64; see also Leonard I Brooks, Whisteblowers... Learn to
Love Them, 20 CANADM. Bus. REv. 19 (Summer 1993).-At that time Watts unsuccessfully ran for
city council of New Orleans. Dumas, supra note 37, at 64. Watts is now working in the federal
government at the Small Business Administration, in Washington D.C. Dumas, supra note 37, at
64.
53. For example, Dr. Richard Walker, a noted scientist with a Ph.D. in physics and nearly 20
years of experience working at A.T.& T.'s prestigious Bell Laboratories, experienced the penalty of
being a whistleblower. In 1971, Walker was the head of a team working on a high-level project for
the U.S. Navy, when he discovered significant miscalculations in the computer projections run by
Bell Labs. Brooks, supra note 52, at 21. He gave this information to his immediate supervisor,
suggesting that the Navy be informed about the problem. His supervisor refused. Brooks, supra
note 52, at 21. Walker subsequently held a corporate seminar inside the company in which he
pointed out the flaws in the project and implied that he felt it was wrong to withhold this kind of
information. Brooks, supra note 52, at 21. Although Walker thought his message had been wellreceived within the company, he was soon transferred to another area at his supervisor's request,
with the Company citing his alleged incompetence as the reason for the transfer. Brooks, supra note
52, at 21. He was relegated to increasingly more mundane assignments until he was fired in 1979
for allegedly showing little interest in his work. Brooks, supra note 52, at 21. Walker responded
by bringing suit in 1982 and after spending $50,000 of his own money in legal fees, and losing his
wife, children, and home in a divorce, his case came to trial in 1987. Brooks, supranote 52, at 21.
It was promptly dismissed by the trial judge, who cited a lack of evidence to support Walker's
allegations. Brooks, supra note 52, at 21.
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repeatedly raised safety concerns at the power plant where he worked 4
In fact, his responsibilities involved reviewing the work of others to

determine whether their work raised safety concerns.

Management

treated this employee with great disdain. He claimed that one of his

supervisors had called him a "bastard." He also stated that a colleague
with whom he was friends said he did not want to be seen walking to the

parking lot with him for fear that management would see them together.
My client gave no moral quarter to management. He did not
believe in the "loyalty-to-his-company-at-all-costs" approach to his work.
His loyalty was to what he believed was a higher morality. In seemingly

being disloyal to his company, he sought to protect the rights and safety
of the public. Oddly enough, in so doing, he may have been more loyal
to the long-range viability of the company than all those corporate
employees who turn their heads when wrongdoing occurs.
Unfortunately, a deep sense of institutional loyalty (as well as fear

of retribution for blowing the whistle) lies within the heart of most
employees, thus making them fiercely loyal to government agencies and
private corporations, even in the face of damaging evidence of wrongdo-

ing, and at the expense of their more altruistic co-workers55 As a result,
rather than being viewed with admiration by their peers, whistleblowers

are treated with scorn and disdain and are often rewarded with labels
such as "snitch,' "rat," and "tattle-tale. 5 6 This is not to say that all
whistleblowers should be viewed as heroes or knights in shining armor.

Some may be ill-informed, meddlesome, troublemakers or ill-motivated
and vindictive. s The purpose of this article, therefore, is to design a
54. The name of the employee, as well as the name of the company, cannot be disclosed
pursuant to a Settlement Agreement reached between the parties, as there is a confidentiality
provision regarding both the facts of his case and the terms of the settlement reached. The
confidentiality provisions, as well as the entire settlement, have been adopted by the Secretary of
Labor and embodied in the Order of the Secretary.
55. See Joan Corbo, Note, Kraus v. New Rochelle Hospital Medical Center. Are Whistleblowers
Finally Getting the Protection They Need? 12 HOFSRA LAB. LJ.141 (1994).
56. Brooks, supra note 52, at 19.
57. In the federal sector, the plight of the federal government whistleblower was delineated
during Congressional hearings on the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989. Pub. L. No. 101-12,
103 Stat. 16 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §1213 (1994)). Although the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
had been in existence for 12 years and supposedly provided protection for federal whistleblowers,
Congress still noted the need for subsequent legislation to provide greater protection. 135 CONG.
REc. S2786-88 (daily ed. March 16, 1989). In discussing the need for passage of the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989, Senator Cohen noted that for
too many years now, Federal employee whistleblowers had been treated shabbily. Too
many have paid a personal price for the millions of dollars they have saved the Government. They have lost their jobs, had promising careers derailed or forfeited promotions as the price for exposing wasteful spending, illegal activity, or hazardous condi-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

7

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor Law Journal
[Vol. 13:1

design a judicial approach that separates the chaff from the wheat, that
protects companies from needless degradation of their reputations and
products, and at the same time protects the whistleblower who has

something to whistle about.
III.

LEGAL STATUS OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER

The judicial approach to whistleblower issues has been mixed.58
Throughout our history, the states have traditionally adhered to an "at
will" employment doctrine, whereby the employer and employee can
terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any reason or for
no reason, unless the employment contract provides otherwise. 5 9 Over
time, courts have tempered the severity of this rule by carving out
limited exceptions to the "at will" doctrine."
Courts delineated
instances in which the "policy" of the state dictated that the "at will"

tions.
Id. at S2787 (statement of Sen. Cohen).
Senator Grassley noted that the Office of Special Counsel, the federal agency established
under the Civil Service Reform Act to stop reprisals against whistleblowers, "has been little more
than a rubber stamp for these reprisals." Id. at S2788 (statement of Sen. Grassley). In fact, in the
eight year history of the Office ofSpecial Counsel, "they have not taken any corrective action ... in
99[%] of their whistleblower cases. That means that 99[% of all cases are closed without the active
investigation ofreprisal against a Government employee for blowing the whistle." 135 CoNG. REC.
H754 (daily ed. March 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
58. See, eg., Corbo,supranote 57, at 150-58 (discussing the approach to whistleblowing taken
by New York courts).
59. See, eg., Winters v. Houston Chron. Publishing Co., 795 S.V.2d 723 (Tex. 1990) (observing that the long-standing rule that employment at will is acceptable and that the alleged
wrongful discharge for reporting the illegal acts of other employees does not fit within the exceptions); Sterling Drug Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988) (holding that termination under
an employment contract with an indefinite term is acceptable).
60. See, eg., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Il1.1981) (where the
court found a cause of action for retaliatory discharge of an employee who offered testimony and
evidence against a co-worker); see also Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724 (quoting Shoaltes v. Signal
Delivery Services Inc., 548 F. Supp. 457 (W.D. Ark. 1982)) (where the court held that the alleged
wrongful discharge for reporting the illegal acts of other employees did not fit within the recognized
exceptions of: (1) an employee being discharged for the "sole reason that the employee refused to
perform an illegal act," or (2) "for an employee who demonstrates that principal reason for discharge
was employer's desire to avoid contributing or paying benefits under the employer's pension fund");
Sterling Drug, 743 S.W.2d at 383 (where the court assessed Arkansas law concerning the
employment at will doctrine as recognizing at least four exceptions to the doctrine: (1) "cases in
which the employee is discharged for refusing to violate a criminal statute"; (2) "cases in which the
employee is discharged for exercising a statutory right"; (3) "cases in which the employee is
discharged for complying with a statutory duty"; and (4)"cases in which employees are discharged
in violation of the general public policy of the state.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss1/3

8

Culp: Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicia

1995]

Wistleblowers:

Corporate Anarchists or Heroes?

employment rule should not be followed.6 ' Thus, many states held that
an employer could not terminate an employee for refusing to perform an
illegal act for the employer.6
Many states have also held that an
employer could not discharge an employee for exercising a statutory
right, such as filing a worker's compensation claim, 63 and could not
terminate an employee for the employer's complying with a statutory
duty, such as for obeying a subpoena to testify at a hearing or for serving
jury duty.
States carved out these limited exceptions for the "at will" employee
on the basis that the public policy of the state clearly called for such an
exception 5 Whistleblowers, however, were generally left unprotected
under these public policy exceptions. For example, in 1974, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Geary v. United States Steel Corp.6 held
that whistleblowers should not be protected from dismissal. 67 George
Geary was a salesman employed by the United States Steel Corporation.68 After fourteen years of exemplary employment, the company
dismissed Geary after he alerted its officials that the tubular product he
was directed to sell to the oil and gas industry was unsafe. 69 In his
complaint, Geary alleged that the product had not been adequately tested
and constituted a serious danger to anyone who used it.7 He told his
supervisors about his misgivings but was ordered to "follow directions"
Nevertheless, he continued to express his reservations, and at
one point spoke to a vice-president in charge of the sale of the product.1 2 In the complaint, he alleged that the product was thereafter

61. E.g., Howard v. Dort Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980) (holding that under Mange
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974), a discharge due to age or sickness does not
constitute a valid claim warranting recovery for breach of contract). The Howardcourt interpreted
Monge to apply "only to a situation where an employee is discharged because he performed an act
that public policy would encourage, or refused to that which public policy would condemn.'
Howard,414 A.2d at 1274; see also Ness v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (employee discharged
for accepting jury duty was entitled to recovery of compensatory damages since, under certain
circumstances, an employer which discharges an employee for a socially undesirable motive is
responsible for any injury caused).
62. See. e.g., Sterling Drug, 795 SAV.2d at 383-84.
63. Id. at 384.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 383.
66. 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
67. Id. at 180.
68. Id. at 175.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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reevaluated and withdrawn from the market.' For his efforts on behalf
of the Company, George Geary was terminated.7 4
The trial court dismissed the complaint, and on appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.75 The Supreme court noted that Geary
had raised the question as to "whether the time ha[d] come to impose
judicial restrictions on an employer's power of discharge. ' 7 6 The
'
answer from the six-member majority was a resounding "no."77
The
court held that despite Geary's praiseworthy motives, the company had
a legitimate interest in "preserving its normal operational procedures
from disruption." ' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that George
Geary could be fired because he had bypassed his immediate superiors
and had taken his case to a company vice-president.79 "The most
natural inference from the chain of events.., is that Geary made a
nuisance of himself, and the company discharged him to preserve
administrative order in its own house.""0 In addition, the majority argued that Geary was not an expert on product safety and was only
involved in the sale of company products8 1 "There is no suggestion
that he possessed any expert qualifications, or that his duties extended to
making judgments in matters of product safety."'
I believe that the
court's rationale is similar to Freddy Prinze's comedy routine of the
1970s: "It ain't my job. 83
Whether Geary was correct in his assessment of the danger to
consumers was irrelevant to the six-member majority. 4 The majority
also noted its concern over the "possible impact of such suits on the
legitimate interest of employers in hiring and retaining the best personnel
available."' 5
The dissent argued that Geary was a responsible employee whose

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 175.
76. Id. at 176.
77. Id. at 176-80.
78. Id. at 180.
79. Id. at 179.
80. Id. at 178.
81. Id. at 178-79.
82. Id. at 179.
83. Prinze frequently appeared on national television in the 1970s and his most popular routine
involved witnessing a variety of catastrophes to which his response consisted merely of the lighthearted utterance, "it ain't myjob." Prinze was most well-known for his role in the popular network
series "Chico and the Man." before he committed suicide in 1977.
84. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 178-80 (Pa. 1974).
85. Id. at 179.
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discharge was "arbitrary and retaliatory." 6 "His suggestion that the
unsafe steel pipe be withdrawn from the market to protect both the public
from danger and his employer from liability was in complete harmony
with his employer's best interest." 87 Moreover, not only would the sale
of a defective product subject his employer to liability; it also exposed
Geary to civil liability!8 The dissent argued that Geary was a loyal
employee,8 9 and noted that "had Geary not informed his superiors of the
defective product, he may well have been discharged for his failure to do
so.390 The dissenter succinctly argued that the "manufacture and
distribution of defective and potentially dangerous products [do] not
serve either the public's or the employer's interest." 91
In addition to the issues the dissent raised, two other points also
deserve mention. First, Geary did not (as the majority concludes) bypass
the internal administrative order of the company. On the contrary, he
first notified his supervisor of the dangerousness of the product, and only
after his complaint fell on deaf ears did he escalate his concern to a vicepresident of the company.92 Thus, Geary did not seek to take his
concern for the product's safety outside the confines of the company but
rather handled the matter internally. Second, that Geary was not an
expert in product safety is irrelevant. The question should be whether he
had reasonable grounds to believe that the product was dangerous and
not what his job description was.
Over twenty years later, the 1974 Geaty decision continues to
accurately delineate the state of Pennsylvania's private sector law.
Although Pennsylvania has recently enacted legislation protecting
whistleblowers in the public sector, 3 many states offer no protection to
the whistleblower in eithei the public or private employment sectors.
Nevertheless, during the last twenty years there has been some movement
in the law to proteot whistleblowers.
One court described this movement
94
as the "wave of the future!"

86. Id. at 180-81.
87. Id. at 181.
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 181.
92. Id. at 179 n.14.
93. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1421-1428 (1991).

94. Cummins v. E.G. and G. Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134,138-39 (D. RI. 1988) (holding that
Rhode Island permits a cause of action in tort for an employee at will against an employer who
discharges the employee for reporting any conduct of the employer in violation of an express
statutory standard).
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The federal government has fared better at protecting whistleblowers
than the states. Several federal statutes protect the whistleblower in
exposing health and safety concerns. These statutes include the Energy
Reorganization Act 9 which protects employees in the nuclear industry
from discrimination and retaliation after notifying an employer of an
alleged violation of the Act;96 the Clean Air Act, 97 which protects
employees who initiate or participate in proceedings under the Act;9" the
Hazardous Substances Release Act,99 which protects employees who
provide information to the government, file charges, or testify at proceedings;' -00 the Safe Drinking Water Act,' 0' which protects employees
who institute, testify at, or participate in proceedings under the Act; 102
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 3 which prohibits employers from using
compliance with the Act as a justification for plant closings or layoffs' 04 in addition to protecting employees who institute or participate
in proceedings under the Act; 5 the Water Pollution Prevention and
Control Act0 " and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 0 7 both of
which protect employees who institute or testify at proceedings under
these Acts.'
In addition to these federal statues, which either provide protection
to employees within specific industrieg, such as the nuclear field, or
protection for specific types of whistleblowing, such as in the area of
environmental safety, Congress also attempted to provide general
protection for federal whistleblowers with the passage of the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA"). 0 9 CSRA protects federal
workers from reprisal for reporting waste, fraud, and abuse in the federal
sector." 0 As Professor Fisher noted in his article on the federal

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
Id. § 5851(a)(1)(A)-(F).
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
Id. § 7622(a)(i)-(3).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9626 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
Id. § 9610(a).

101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988).
102. Id. § 300j-9Ci)(1)(A)-(C).
103. 42 U.S.C. §9 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1994).

104. Id. § 6971(a).
105. Id. §-6971(e).
106. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).

107. 15 U.S.C.

§§ 2601-2692 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).

108. 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a)(I)-(3).
109. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-454,92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in

scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
110. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
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whistleblower,"'

the areas

in which the federal law.. protects

whistleblowers include "violations of any law, rule, or regulation;
mismanagement; gross waste of funds; abuses of authority; or substantial

and specific danger to public health and safety."'" 2 In 1989, Congress
sought to strengthen the protection afforded to federal whistleblowers by

amending CSRA with the passage of the Whistleblower Protection Act
of 1989."' One of the changes was to amend the standard reporting
requirements for CSRA claims." 4 As Professor Fisher explains, the

Federal Whistleblower Protection Act is not complete because certain
federal agencies are exempt from coverage such as the FBI, the Central

Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, and the General Accounting Office." 5 The

federal act, therefore, enables some agencies to cover up their misconduct
and abuse."t 6 Government corporations, such as the Resolution Trust
Corporation involved in the Savings and Loan bailout, are also exempt
from coverage under the Act." 7
Congress' exclusion of particular agencies from the Federal

Ill. Bruce D. Fisher, The Whisdeblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope for
Whistleblowenr, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355 (1991).
112. Id. at 375-76.
113. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1213 (1994). During Congressional hearings on the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989, several senators and representatives spoke of the ineffectiveness ofthe Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 in protecting whistleblowers. Senator Levin noted that despite the Civil
Service Reform Act, "Federal employees are faced with extraordinary pressures not to expose waste
and mismanagement by their agencies.... [And those that do] may be threatened with on-the-job
harassment, negative job ratings, unfavorable transfers, denial of promotions, and even dismissal."
135 CoNG. REc. S2779 (daily ed. March 16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Levin). Senator Levin also
stated that despite the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act II years earlier, recent surveys
"indicate that 70[%] of Federal employees with knowledge of waste and inefficiency do not report
the waste and inefficiency. Seventy percent do not report it because of the fear of retaliation.' Id.
During Congressional debates, Representative Schroeder adamantly argued that the "whistleblower
protection statute [the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 has been] on the books since 1978, and
there is absolutely no question it did not work." 135 CONG. REC. H752 (daily ed. March 21, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Schroeder). Among other changes, the 1989 Whistleblower Protection Act
lowered the burden of proof for a government employee alleging retaliation for whistleblowing,
increased the independence of the Office of Special Counsel charged with the duty of investigating
complaints of whistleblowers, provided whistleblowers greater confidentiality for blowing the
whistle, and granted federal employees the right to go to federal court to prevent an adverse
personnel action. See 135 CONG. REC. H754 (daily ed. March 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Moyer);
135 Cong. Rec. H747 (daily ed. March 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Sikorski); 135 CONG. REc.
S2786.88 (daily ed. March 16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
114. See Fisher, supra note 111, at 380-92; see also Fisher, supra note Ill, at 397-407
(discussing other changes in the federal law).
115. Fisher, supra note 111, at 407-08.
116. Fisher, supra note 111, at 408.
117. Fisher, supra note 111, at 408-09.
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Whistleblower's Protection Act is questionable. The effect that these
agencies can have on the moral well-being or malevolence of the country
seems astronomical, as examples from Richard Nixon's Presidency so
clearly indicate. For instance, the release of Nixon's infamous White
House tapes"' reveal Nixon's misuse of such federal agencies as the
CIA and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). In 1991, the release of
sixty additional hours of White House tapes "came as a timely reminder,"
wrote Margaret Carlson of Time magazine, that Nixon is "an unindicted
co-conspirator who is lucky to have escaped prison.""' 9 Listen to any
random conversation on the tapes, Carlson wrote, and "the mask of
respectable elder statesman melts away to reveal a deceitful, lowbrow,
vindictive character, dangerously armed with the full power of the IRS,
FBI, and CIA, and all too willing to use it."'20 Thus, Nixon orders that
his political enemies be audited: "'We have to do it artfully so that we
don't create an issue by abusing the IRS politically,' says Nixon, warming to the subject.'
And there are ways to do it. Goddam it, sneak
in in the middle of the night.""'
At one point in the tapes, Nixon
also spoke of "sacking IRS Commissioner Johnnie Walters for refusing
to harass Nixon's enemies: 'Kick Walter's ass out first, and get a man
''123
in there.
It is not in the country's best interests to exclude the FBI, CIA, or
General Accounting Office from the Federal Whistleblower Protection
Act. All that is being asked is that these agencies follow the law and not
engage in malfeasance. 2 4 It is not an adequate reply to this premise
to say that Nixon was a maverick President whose malfeasance perhaps
exceeds other Presidencies. To so argue misses the point. If and when
federal agencies engage in serious wrongdoing, a whistleblower should
be protected from retaliation or firing, as the actions of the whistleblower
118. See Margaret Carlson, WatergateRevisited Notesfrom Underground,TIME, June 17,1991,
at 27 (discussing the release of taped conversations of former President Nixon in the Oval Office
in 1974). In 1991, 60 additional hours of tapes were released which had heretofore "languished for
nearly two decades in the National Archives while Nixon lawyers and the government argued how
to release them. . " Id. The tapes show "how coarse and ruthless a man" Nixon was. Id. "At one
point he enthuses over a suggestion to recruit 'eight thugs' from the Teamsters Union 'murderers' to gang up on peace protestors" against the Vietnam War. Id. "'They've got guys who
will go in and knock their heads off,' says Nixon!' Id. "'Sure,'adds [Bob] Haldeman [Nixon's Chief
of Staff], 'Beat the s- - -out of some of these people."') Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 5 U.S.C. § 1213 (1994).
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are serving to protect the public and the integrity of the agency for whom
that whistleblower works.' s
There are other structural weaknesses in the Federal Vhistleblower
Protection Act. For example, one provision turns over the investigation
and report writing in response to the whistleblower's allegations to the
very agency on which the whistle was blown. 126 Moreover, even with
the passage of the CSRA and the amendments to that Act in the Federal
Whistleblower Protection Act, federal employees remain concerned about
reprisals for reporting mismanagement and abuse.' 27 A survey of
federal employees confirmed that the "fear of reprisal for reporting
misconduct continues to be a concern for many federal employees:"'
Although perhaps not perfect, the federal law has made significant
strides to protect whistleblowers in federal agencies. In addition to the
movement in the federal sector, many states also provide some protection
for whistleblowers. Most of this protection has been provided through
state legislation.'29 In the absence of such legislation, state courts have
been reluctant to create a public policy exception to the "at will"
employment doctrine for whistleblowers, 30 even where the
whistleblower complains only internally and there exists a substantial risk
of harm to the public due to the company's actions. Some states
however, such as Massachusetts, have modified the common law "at
will" employment doctrine to protect whistleblowers.
In Sullivan v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,'3 1 a
federal district court determined that, under Massachusetts law,
whistleblowers are protected.
In Sullivan, the plaintiff had been
33
hired by the defendant company as an assistant securities analyst.
He stated that during his employment, he "became concerned that he
would be subject to liability for possible insider trading violations at his
job" with the defendant. 134 The plaintiff repeatedly expressed these
concerns to his superiors. 35 He also acknowledged that he had very

125. Fisher, supra note I11,
at 415.
126. 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994).
127. GEN. ACcr. OmmCa REP., 1VinsTLEBLOWERs PROTECnON: SURVEY OF FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES ON MISCONDUCT AND PROTECTION FROM REPRISALS 3 (July 1992).

128. Id.

129. See infra text accompanying notes 150-64.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 150-64.
131. 802 F. Supp. 716 (D.Conn. 1992).

132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 720.
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little eipertise in insider trading.'36 His superiors instructed him to
cease discussion of the issue with them and not to discuss the issue with
anyone outside of the department. 3 The plaintiff was told "that if he
persisted in pursuing the matter, he would be 'out the door."" 3 8 He
subsequently received a bad performance evaluation and was fired.'39
At the oral argument on defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff acknowledged that he would not be able to prove that the defenNevertheless, the
dant had actually violated the securities law.'
district court held that under the common law of Massachusetts, the
plaintiff was a protected whistleblower, provided he could show that he
was fired for raising the potential securities violations internally with the
company.

41

The court delineated very expansive protection for
whistleblowers 42 The defendant argued that the plaintiff should not
be a protected whistleblower since the whistleblowing activity in which
he was engaged did not involve an issue of public health or safety. The
court disagreed, 4 holding that "while many whistleblowing cases do
concern health and safety, the cases themselves do not purport to state
such a limitation.""' The defendant also argued that the plaintiff
should not be a protected whistleblower since he had not reported the
suspected securities violation to the authorities.'4 5 Again, the court
disagreed with the defendant, stating that a rule permitting the employer
to fire a whistleblower with impunity before the employee contacted the
authorities would encourage employers promptly to discharge employees
In addition, such a rule
who bring complaints to their attention.'
would give employees an incentive to bypass management and go
directly to the authorities. 47 Such a rule would, in turn, deprive
management of the opportunity to correct oversights or wrongdoing on
its own. 48 As the court noted, "a contrary rule would be needless pub-

136. Id.
137. Id.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 721.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 723.

142. Id. at 723-26.
143. Id. at 723-24.

144. Id. at 724.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 724-25.

147. Id. at 725.
148. Id.
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lie investigations
of matters best addressed internally in the first
149
instance.
The Sullivan court held that a whistleblower should be protected if
he is discharged for reporting suspected violations of the law, where the
belief is reasonable and in good faith.'
The court reasoned that "a
standard of reasonable belief encourages a whistleblower to come forward, rather than remain silent out of fear that he might be wrong.''
The court noted that although some states have statutes which protect
whistleblowers, in Massachusetts, "the employees' whistleblowing rights
are now largely the product of evolving common law.""
The Massachusetts approach seems to have much to offer where the
whistleblower is merely raising concerns internally within his/her
company and is acting in good faith. After all, raising an employee's
concerns within the company does not damage the public reputation of
that company, nor does it detrimentally affect the sale of the company's
products. Instead, such an "open-door" management policy encourages
employees, without fear of retribution, to raise issues of moral concern
with the company. This, in turn, may be beneficial to the company in
the long run. In Sullivan, the plaintiff may have been misguided in his
concern about insider trading violations, but if he was acting in good
faith, there was virtually no harm to the company. Open communication
between management and employees should be encouraged, not
discouraged.
Another state that has judicially carved out an exception to the "at
wil" employment doctrine is Kansas. In Stuart v. Beech Aircraft
Corp.,) ' 3 the federal district court noted that in 1988 the Kansas
Supreme Court in Palmerv. Brown had extended the tort of retaliatory
discharge to cases involving "whistleblowing."' 4 The Palmer court
outlined the parameters of the Kansas law, holding that public policy
requires citizens to be protected from reprisals for reporting serious
infractions of rules, regulations, or the law pertaining to public health,
safety, and the general welfare. 5 In order to recover for wrongful
discharge, the whistleblower must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that a reasonably prudent person would have concluded that the
149. Id.
at 725.
150. Id.

151. Id.
152. Id. at 726.

153. 753 F.Supp. 317 (D. Kan. 1990).
154. Id. at 324 (quoting Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 689-90 (Kan. 1988)).
155. Palmer,752 P.2d at 689.
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employer was engaged in activities in violation of the law.15 6 The
report must also be "done out of a good faith concern over the wrongful
activity reported rather than from a corrupt motive such as malice, spite,
jealousy, or personal gain."'5 s7 The court further held that a whistleblower was protected whether he reported the infraction "to either
company management or law enforcement officials."' 58 In delineating
its whistleblower rule, the Kansas court infused elements into that rule
that many other courts have not. Most notably, the Kansas judiciary has
established that the plaintiff must prove his case of retaliatory discharge
for whistleblowing by clear and convincing evidence.'
The Palmer
court held the plaintiff to a higher burden of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard because of its concern over frivolous
whistleblowing claims. Unlike some other jurisdictions, the Kansas rule
also requires that a "serious" infraction be at issue, thus attem~ting to
eliminate whistleblowing claims for trivial matters.'" However, given
the strictness of the Kansas rule, there is no requirement that the
whistleblower raises his/her concerns internally before going to law
enforcement officials. 6' The Kansas whistleblower may bypass his
company and go directly to a law enforcement agency.
Although in the last several years, some states, such as Massachusetts and Kansas, have judicially created protection for whistleblowers
through the evolution of their common law, most states, such as Missouri, have left the issue of whistleblower protection to the legislature.'6
In varying degrees, several state legislatures have enacted
protection for whistleblowers. For example, Colorado, Iowa, Texas, and
Pennsylvania all have statutes that protect only public sector employees
who blow the whistle on their employers."
In Colorado, state
employees are protected from retaliation for the disclosure of any action,
practice, or procedure that relates to, interalia,the waste of public funds,
abuse of authority, or mismanagement of any state agency." Furthermore, the statute does not provide a de minimis standard whereby only

156. Id. at 690.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Komm v. MoFliker, 662 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
163. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-50.5-101 (West 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.29 (West
1987); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1421 (1988); TEXAS GOV'T CODE ANN. § 554.002 (West 1994).
164. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50.5-101-107 (West 1990).
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significant allegations of wrongdoing are protected, as the Kansas courts
have done by judicial decision. 65
In contrast, Iowa protects an employee of a political subdivision of
the state for the disclosure of information which "the employee
reasonably believes evidences a violation of law or rule, mismanagement,... or a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety."'
Iowa, therefore, at least as the section relates to public
health
or safety, does require that a substantial and specific danger
e 1st67

exist."

On the other hand, Texas provides that a local government body
cannot retaliate against a public employee who "reports a violation of
law to an appropriate law enforcement authority" if the report is made in
good faith. 6 Thus, the law apparently protects a public employee
only if the employee complains to a law enforcement authority, and the
employee may not be protected if he/she reports the violation internally.
Although some states have enacted legislation protecting only
employees in the public employment sector who "whistleblow" on the
government,1 69 other states have enacted more sweeping legislation and
offer protection to private sector employees!" ° In this regard, three
state statutes are indicative of the range of legislation covering
whistleblowers in the private employment sector.171 They are Florida,
New Jersey, and Michigan.
The Florida whistleblower statute172 covers every private employer
that "employs ten or more persons."'7 The Act provides that:
[A]n employer may not take any retaliatory personnel action against an
employee because the employee has... disclosed, or threatened to
disclose, to any appropriate governmental agency.., an activity, policy, or practice of the employer that is in violation of a law, rule, or
regulation. However, this subsection does not apply unless the
employee has, in writing, brought the activity, policy, or practice to the
attention of a supervisor orthe employer and has afforded the employer

165. See Stuart v. Beech, 753 F. Supp. 317,324 (D. Kan. 1990).
166. IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.29 (West 1991).
167. Id.
168. TExAS GOV'T CODE ANN. § 554.002 (West 1994).
169. IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.29 (West 1991).
170. See, eg., MIcH. COmP. LAWS ANN. § 15.361-369 (West 1994).
171. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.101-105 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. §
15.361-369 (West 1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1-8 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
172. FLA. STAT. Ann. § 448.101-105 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
173. Id. § 448.101(3).
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a reasonable opportunity to correct the activity, policy, or practice. 74
The Act defines "law, rule, or regulation" to include any statute, ordinance or regulation adopted by a government body. 5
Several provisions of the Florida Act merit attention. First, the Act
provides protection to a private sector whistleblower for de minimis
violations of statutory law. 76 Second, the Act only provides a whistleblower protection if the employee can show that there is, in fact, a
violation of a statute. 7 Thus, the George Gearys 171 of the world who
protest the sale of dangerous products apparently are not protected under
the Florida statute, Third, the whistleblower does not receive the protection of the statute unless the employee first informs her employer and allows the employer the opportunity to correct the problem. 79 Fourth,
the whistleblower is protected for disclosing, or "threatening to disclose"
to any appropriate government agency a violation of the statutory
law.'
The whistleblower is therefore protected if he threatens
disclosure, but is not protected if he disseminates the information to the
public or to interested persons. Protection is available only if the
disclosure outside the company is to an appropriate government
agency'
Although this limitation may sound like a good idea, as it
seemingly balances the employer's interest of preserving its reputation
with the interest of disclosure, in some instances this limitation would be
unreasonable. For example, in cases where the company refuses to
correct the wrongdoing, it may be necessary to go directly to the persons
being harmed instead of reporting the employer's activity to a government agency. More specifically, if a company is selling a product that
harms the public, such as A.H. Robbins' sale of the interuterine device,
the Dalkon Shield,"RI which in many instances caused severe medical

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. § 448.101.
Id. § 448.101(4).
Id. § 448.101-102.
Id.

178. See Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
179. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).

180. Id.
181. Id. § 448.102(1)-(2).
182. See GEORGE A. STEINER & JOHN F. STEINER, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND SOcIETY: A

MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE, TEXT AND CASES, 205-14 (6th ed. 1991) (explaining the Dalkon Shield
case). The Dalkon Shield, an I.U.D. designed to prevent pregnancy, was marketed in the 1960's by
the A.H. Robins Company. Id. A.H. Robins did no research on the Dalkon Shield's safety before
selling it to an unsuspecting public. The Dalkon Shield was defective, causing unwanted pregnancies

in some women, sterility in others, and death in some cases due to toxic shock syndrome, in which
death ensued within 31 to 72 hours ofthe onset ofinfection. Technicians at A.H. Robins discovered
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problems, including in some cases sterility and even death, then going to
a government agency may do little good."83
New Jersey also provides protection to whistleblowers in the private
employment sector.I Entitled the Conscientious Employee Protection
Act ("CEPA"), the New Jersey Act is similar to Florida's statute in that
it prohibits an employer from taking any retaliatory action against an
employee where the employee "discloses or threatens to disclose to a
supervisor or to a public body any activity, policy or practice of the
employer that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of law,
An employer is defined as any individual,
rule or regulation." '
partnership, association, or corporation, and CEPA does not require, as
does the Florida statute, that the employer have a minimum of ten
employees before invoking its proscriptions.'8 6 As in Florida, New
Jersey requires that the employee first disclose the wrongdoing to the
employer."s However, unlike Florida, disclosure to the employer is
not required where the situation is "emergency in nature."8
Although the language in the New Jersey statute is all-inclusive, in
Littnan v. Firestone ire & Rubber Co., 89 a federal district court held
that the statute is only concerned "with illegal activity which harms the
public.'"" Because the plaintiff complained only of fraudulent activity
committed by management within the company itself, the court held that
the plaintiff was not entitled to protection under the New Jersey
whistleblower statute.' 91

In addition to Florida and New Jersey, Michigan has also enacted
a statute protecting the whistleblower in the private employment

that the filament string or tail to the Shield collected bacteria and caused much of the Shield's
problems. For 6.1 cents, the string could have been changed, making the Shield safer. The
company chose not to take such action. Id. at 209. No employee at the company disclosed this
information to the women who had set these time bombs within their bodies.
133. The Food and Drug Administration moved slowly on the Dalkon Shield problem. In 1974,
in spite of its mounting evidence of the Shield's danger to women, the Food and Drug Administration "recommended" that Robins take the Shield off the market but did not force the company to
do so. Id. at 210. In 1984, Robins finally recalled the Shield from the market. Id. at 212.
184. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1-5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).

185. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(a).
186. N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 34:19-2(a); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.

§448.101(3) (West 1981 & Supp.

1995).
187. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4.
188. Id.

189. 715 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
190. Id. at 93.
191. Id.
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arena. 92 In fact, Michigan was the first jurisdiction to provide general
statutory whistleblower protection when it enacted the Michigan
Whistleblowers Protection Act in 1981. 3 The Michigan statute provides that an employer shall not retaliate or discriminate against an
employee "because the employee ... reports or is about to report,
verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or
regulation or rule... to a public body, unless the employee knows that
the report is false."' 194
Unlike the Florida and New Jersey statutes, the Michigan statute
does not require the whistleblower to report wrongdoing within the
company before reporting the wrongdoing to a public body.'95 One
commentator critical of this omission argued that it "not only fails to
give employers the initial opportunity to correct their own violations, but
may actually196encourage employees to bypass their employers' internal
procedures."'
In addition, as opposed to the Florida and New Jersey statutes which
require that the whistleblower act reasonably (an objective standard), the
Michigan statute provides the whistleblower protection unless he knows
that his "report is false" (a subjective good faith standard).' 97 In this
regard, Michigan affords greater protection to a whistleblower than New
Jersey and Florida. Whether this added protection is justified, or whether
it subjects the employer to defamatory harm as a result of careless
actions on the part of its employee, is another matter. In fact, Michigan's subjective good faith standard may be inappropriate where the
employee goes outside the company to a government agency or to the
public to report suspected wrongdoing, as it "may actually discourage
employees from investigating and verifying their suspicions before
reporting their employers."' 9' By contrast, an objective good faith
standard "could result in an implied duty to make a reasonable investigation prior to blowing the whistle."'19 9 Since false accusations can
seriously harm the employer's reputation and business, requiring the
employee to make a reasonable investigation prior to blowing the whistle

192. MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 15.361-369 (West 1981).
193. Martin H. Malin, Protecingthe Whisdeblowerfrom RetaliatoryDischarge,16 MiCm. . OF

L. REFoRM 277, 304 (1982).
194. MICH. CowP. LAWS. ANN. § 15.362.
195. Malin, supra note 193, at 305.
196. Malin, supra note 193, at 305.
197. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 15361.

198. Malin, supra note 193, at 306.
199. Malin, supra note 193, at 306.
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externally and vilifying the employer does not seem too much to ask.
IV.

TOWARDS A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE

In summary, although there has been a movement to protect the
whistleblower during the past several years, the protection afforded the
whistleblower has been inconsistent from state to state. Some states provide no protection, others provide protection only to government

employees, while others provide protection in varying degrees to private
sector employees. The courts and legislatures have struggled with where
to draw the line in the sand to protect whistleblowers, no doubt fearing
an avalanche of cases. Implicit is the belief (perhaps overstated and
outdated in today's society) that an employer should have an unfettered
right to run its business as it sees fit and to select and retain whatever
employees it wishes.

The problem this raises is that when business is engaged in
wrongdoing, the failure to protect whistleblowers becomes tantamount to
the law encouraging employees to behave immorally. The legal system
in such an instance is telling the employee to be loyal to the company at
any cost because the price to pay, the loss of one's job, is more than

many employees are willing to bear.200 So, employees rationalize their

200. Although most employees are unwilling to put their careers on the line by blowing the
whistle, some employees have been successful in winning vhistleblowing cases. For example, in
Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. L-17014-90 (Mar. 24, 1994), a New Jersey state trial court
returned a verdict for a whistleblower for a case he brought under New Jersey's whistleblower
statute. See 10 NAT'L JURY VERDICT REV. & ANALYSIS 3 (Dec. 1994). The whistleblower plaintiff
claimed he had been wrongfully"terminated in retaliation for his advising managers at the Japanese
subsidiary corporate offices that changes in the manufacturing [of gasoline] would be required,
notwithstanding the cost of several hundred million dollars per plant, because of the high level of
benzene in the gasoline and the resulting health hazards:' Id. at 4. The plaintiff, who had been
earning in excess of $300,000 a year, claimed that he could never again work in the private sector
in his field. Id."The jury found for the plaintiff.., and awarded $3,440,000 in compensatory
damages and S3,500,000 in punitive damages:' Id. The trial court set aside the compensatory
damage verdict, but held that the punitive damage award was appropriate. Id.
In Pennsylvania, a jury returned a verdict for a plaintiff under that state's whistleblower law
protecting public employees. See 5 NAT'L JURY AND VEDicr REv. & ANALYSIS 43 (Apr. 1990)
(discussing McDonald v. McCarthy, No. CIV.A.89-319, 1990 WL 131393 (E.D. Pa Sept. 7, 1990)).
In McDonald,the plaintiff contended that he was terminated from his position as a part time police
officer in retaliation for his videotaping a city councilman allegedly dumping debris within a city
park. Id. He claimed that he brought this to the attention of his superiors and was terminated within
a few days. Id. The jury awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in compensatory damages and punitive
damages in the amount of S15,000. Id.
In another case, Speck v. Deniham, No. C2-89-107 (July24, 1990), a whistleblower received
a $225,336 jury verdict in an Ohio state court for being disciplined in retaliation for his reporting
allegations of government corruption and for suffering mental anxiety, humiliation, and emotional
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behavior and turn their heads away from corporate wrongdoing. The
movement to protect whistleblowers is a movement to bring one's moral
obligations to society in line with the law. The question remains, of
course, as to where to draw the line in the sand. The question remains as
to how to protect the employer against malicious and harmful actions of
its employees while concurrently protecting employees who swim against
the corporate culture to enforce what they believe is a higher morality.
In this regard, a cause of action should be provided to
whistleblowers not only in the public sector but also in the private
employment arena. I propose a two-tier approach in both the public and
private sectors. The standard for allowing an employee to raise concerns
about his employer's activity should shift, depending on whether the
employee is raising the issue internally (within the company) or
externally (outside the company to a government agency or directly to
the public). If the employee raises an issue within the company as to the
company's suspected malfeasance, the employee should be protected
from retaliation or loss of his/her job where the employee's concerns are
reasonable and in good faith, and not motivated out of ill will, malice,
or spite. In such a situation, there is little if any detriment to the
company. The employee, after all, is not airing the company's dirty
linen in public.
A responsible employer should encourage its employees to come
forward with information or concerns about the company's alleged
mismanagement, negligence, or abusive practices. Such an open-door
policy and dialogue between management and the employee may result
in the company's focusing clearly and thoroughly on a problem, the
resolution.of which may save the company substantial sums of money by
decreasing the potential for lawsuits.

distress. See 6 NAT'L JURY VERDICT REV. AND ANALYSIS 37-38 (June, 1991). In Benecke v.
Lockheed Corp., No. C 621967 (Nov. 15, 1990), three plaintiffs alleged that they were terminated
after raising safety concerns with their company. See 6 NAT'L JURY VERDICT REV. AND ANALYSIS

47 (Feb., 1991). Thejury awarded one plaintiff "$167,065 lost earnings, $35,000 emotional distress
damages, and $15,000 punitive damages [the second plaintiff] $45,660 lost earnings, $46,000
emotional distress damages; and $15,000 punitive damages [and the third plaintiff] S27,281 lost

earnings, $55,000 emotional distress damages, and $15,000 punitive damages." Id.
Lastly, in Bartzv. Bowles Distribution, Inc., No. 87-2-01072-3 (Feb. 20,1990), a Washington
state jury awarded the plaintiff whistleblower $50,000 after she was terminated for reporting to the
police the illegal activity of a preferred customer of the defendant employer. Id. at 48. Nonetheless,
in spite of these verdicts in favor of the whistleblower, the risks to one's career for blowing the
whistle still remains great and cannot be ignored.
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One example of this is the case of George Geary,2"' the whistleblower in Pennsylvania who raised concerns with management over the
danger of a product he was charged with selling?0 2 Although the
product was later taken off the market because of its dangers 0 3 and
Geary may have saved his company substantial sums of money, he was
still discharged?" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the termination, refusing to create a judicially-crafted whistleblower rule in the
private sector.2 ' That case was wrongly decided.
In addition to imposing a "good faith" requirement on the
whistleblower, the legal system should require employees, in all but the
most exigent of circumstances, to raise their concerns initially through
internal corporate channels before blowing the whistle externally to either
a government agency or the public. This would "give employers the
initial opportunity to correct their own violations," 2 6 and encourage
resolution within the company.2 '
Those employees who blow the whistle externally should face a
more difficult burden before receiving protection under the law. In such
a case, there is a significant possibility of harm to the company's
reputation and to its financial viability for wrongful accusations. In
addition to the "good faith" requirement and the requirement that the
employee should normally first raise the issue internally, an employee
who blows the whistle to those outside the corporation should face the
following additional burdens. First, the employee must be motivated by
a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting the public or others.
The employer should not be subjected to the gauntlet for every de
minimis violation of a statute where there is little harm to the public.
Second, before an employee should be allowed to blaspheme his
employer outside the company, he should be required to make a
reasonable investigation prior to blowing the whistle. Failure to conduct
a reasonable investigation would be irresponsible and akin to negligent
defamation of the company if the information disseminated by the

201. Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974); see supra notes 66-94 and accompany-

ing text (discussing Mr. Geary's case).
202.
203.
204.
205.

Geary, 319 A.2d at 175 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 176-80.

206. Malin,supra note 193, at 305.
207. Malin,supra note 193, at 305.
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whistleblower is false.2 °8 Third, the employee should be protected for
blowing the whistle externally only if the employee was correct about the
corporate wrongdoing. As noted in Clark v. Modern Group Ltd., 09 "A
company acting within the law is presumed to pose no threat to the
public at large.""21 Thus, protecting a whistleblower who incorrectly
believes that the company has violated the law offers little benefit to the
public but could result in serious harm to the business. As described in
Clark,to protect an employee who incorrectly, but in good faith, believes
that there is corporate wrongdoing means that a company would be "free
to act only at the sufferance of its employees whenever reasonable men
or women can differ about the meaning or application of a law governing
Moreover, to require that a
the action the employer proposes."
whistleblower move cautiously and make sure of his/her facts seems
prudent and a proper balancing of the interests involved. That is,
protecting the public interest on the one hand, and the company's
reputation and good name on the other.
In other areas, however, the whistleblower's protection should be
broader than is generally true in those jurisdictions that, in varying
Many states protect the
degrees, protect the whistleblower.
whistleblower from retaliation only if the whistleblowing is in regard to
the company having violated a law, rule, or regulation.2 t2 The implication of such a rule is that unless the whistleblower can pinpoint a
statute that the company has violated, she may not be protected.
But whistleblowers should be protected if they "blow the whistle"
on corporate wrongdoing regardless of whether a specific statute has
been violated. Thus, whistleblowers should be protected from retaliation
if they report their company's negligence which harms the public even
if a specific statute has not been violated. Not only have legislators set
out the rules by which a business must play, but the judiciary, through
its application and molding of the common law, has also set the
boundaries for corporate behavior. The law should protect the
whistleblower in such instances.
Moreover, the most obvious omission in the legislation and judicial

208. Defamation is defined as "that which tends to injure 'reputation' in the popular sense; to
diminish esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence on which the plaintiff held, or to excite adverse,
derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." NV. PAGE KE-TON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 777 (5th ed. 1984).
209. 9 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 1993).

210. Id. at 332.
211. Id.
212. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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decisions which have sought to protect whistleblowers is that neither
protects the whistleblower when he contacts the media or public with his
concerns.
Although those jurisdictions that have protected
whistleblowers allow the employee to "sing" to government agencies,
none have provided broader protection. And yet, where there is
substantial harm to the public or to individuals, as in the case of the
space shuttle Challenger, the law should protect the whistleblower from
retaliation regardless of the party to whom the employee reports
corporate wrongdoing. In the Challenger case, Roger Boisjoly and other
engineers at Morton Thiokol emphatically and continually raised
concerns internally within the company as to the likelihood of the
Challenger's solid-rocket boosters malfunctioning in a cold weather
launch. Nevertheless, Boisjoly's protection and continued employment
should not turn on whether he thereafter notified an appropriate
government agency or went public with the information. Given the
emergency situation that confronted Boisjoly and the other engineers on
January 27, 1986, the night before the ill-fated lift-off, Boisjoly would
have been justified in calling the astronauts directly and relaying his concerns to them about the launch.
At least one commentator has suggested that the night before the
Challenger launch, the engineers should have taken further steps, both
inside and outside the corporation, to "pursue their instincts about the
launch.""2 3 That commentator suggests that an engineer, such as
Boisjoly, who knew "more about o-rings than anyone" and who "eats,
sleeps, and drinks o-rings,"214 should have made an end-run around
management directly "to the CEO of Morton or to the press to question
the launch decision before the fact.""1 5 I would go one step further.
It seems to me that the engineers had a right, and indeed a moral
responsibility, to go directly to the seven astronauts and voice their
concerns about the launch to them. This would have given the astronauts
the ability to shape their own destiny. They could have decided to fly,
or they could have refused to board the Challenger for lift-off. Instead,
just as the public was unsuspecting of the time-bomb I.U.D. in the
Dalkon Shield case, the astronauts lifted off on that disastrous day of
January 28, 1986 absolutely oblivious to the dangers before them.
213. See Werhane, supranote 4, at 605. Ms. Werhane is the Wirtenberger Professor ofBusiness
Ethics at Loyola University of Chicago. She is one of the founding members and a past president
of the Society for Business Ethics. She has also been the editor-in-chief of Business Ethics
Quarterly.
214. Werhane, supra note 4, at 608.
215. Werhane, supra note 4, at 611.
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If Boisjoly or another engineer had, in fact, gone to the CEO, the
press, or directly to the astronauts, then the legal system should protect
him from being discharged, demoted, or otherwise discriminated against
for such whistleblowing activity. In other words, in some situations the
employee must be able to blow the whistle directly to the public, where
the need is great and where the company and appropriate government
agencies have turned a deaf ear to the likelihood of serious harm to
others. In those instances, the employee's job should be secure because
that employee has benefitted the public as well as the employer.216 As
discussed previously, several state whistleblowing statutes provide that
an employee must first raise his concerns internally within the company,
and then after giving the employer a reasonable amount of time to
correct the wrongdoing, the employee can blow the whistle with the
appropriate governmental agency.2 17 The statutes, however, do not protect an employee who blows the whistle directly to the public. I am
suggesting that these statutes are too narrow and rigid. In most
circumstances it certainly makes good sense to have the employee raise
his concerns internally within the company before proceeding to the
appropriate government agency if the company's response is unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, in some situations, the employee should be permitted
to blow the whistle directly to the public or to the people affected where
the potential for harm is great and time is of the essence.
Another example of such a situation is Ford's marketing of the
Pinto, even though the Ford Company knew that the rear end collapsed
in low speed crashes, causing the gas tank in some instances to
explode t3 Ford Motor Company began selling the Pinto in 1971.209
Ford rushed the car into the market in much less than the usual time
because it was fighting stiff competition from Volkswagen for the smallcar market."o The design of the car, however, "placed the fuel tank
such that if the car was hit from the rear at a speed above 20 miles per
hour, it would be punctured by a bolt from the bumper and could

216. It is unlikely that the standard I am suggesting will result in a flood of frivolous lawsuits

or needless defamation of corporations. Rather, the legal standard is sufficiently difficult for the
employee who goes "public" with the information of possible corporate wrongdoing that I do not
believe that the employee will embark upon such a course, except in the most extreme of
circumstances, where there is serious harm to the public.
217. See, eg., supra notes 172-81.
218. See Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, (SeptlOct. 1977), reprintedin TAKING
SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL IssuEs INBUSINESS, ETHICS AND SOCIETY 202,20204 (Lisa H. Newton & Maureen M. Ford eds., 3d ed. 1994)

219. RICHARD DE GEORGE, BUSINESS ETHICS 221-22 (4th ed. 1995).
220. See Dowie, supra note 218, at 203.
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Ford conducted a study and "determined
possibly burst into flame!'
that if a baffle (estimated at costing between $6.65 and $11.00) were
placed between the bumper and the gas tank, the Pinto would be
comparable to other cars of its class with respect to the danger of fire
from rear-end impact." m Conducting a cost-benefit analysis, however,
the company concluded that it would be cheaper to pay off bum victims
injured or killed by such exploding gas tanks than place a baffle between
the bumper and the gas tank.2m It has been estimated that Pinto
crashes caused between 500 and 900 bum deaths 4 before Ford, in
1978, finally recalled the Pinto to insert the baffle?2' During the eight
years that Ford marketed the Pinto before recalling it, Ford, of course,
never informed the public that the car was "less safe than comparable
cars with respect to rear-end impact" nor did the company even offer
consumers "the option of purchasing the baffle." 6 The company
stood by, silently, while many needless victims died.
In the Pinto case, a Ford employee should certainly have been able
to raise his concerns within the company, and it would make sense for
him to raise those concerns internally before going elsewhere. 2 7 But
at some point, it also makes good moral sense for the employee to
proceed to a government agency or to the public with this information?"8 In such a situation, the employee should not lose his job, as
he/she has accurately disseminated information about a serious risk of
injury to consumers and the public.
Lastly, the question remains whether the whistleblower must prove

221. DE GEORGE, supra note 219, at 221.
222. DE GEORGE, supra note 219, at 221.

223. DE GEORGE, supra note 219, at 221-22. In addition to Ford's actions being morally
reprehensible, Ford's cost-benefit analysis was incorrect. As it turned out, suits brought against Ford
and the amount it had to pay, (estimated at more than $50 million) far exceeded what it saved ($20.9
million) by not correcting the defect- not to mention the cost of bad publicity. DEGEORGEsupra
note 219, at 221-22.
224. Dowie, supra note 218, at 203.

225. DE GEORGE, supra 219, at 222.
226. DE GEORGE, supra note 219, at 222.

227. Apparently, Harley Copp, a Ford executive and engineer, was critical ofthe Pinto from the
start but left the company and voiced his criticism. DE GEoRGE, supra note 219, at 222. Ideally
Copp should not have had to choose between his job and being morally responsible. In such a
situation, most employees will remain silent. In many instances, this silence not only seriously
harms the unsuspecting public, but it is also detrimental to the company's long-range financial
health.

228. Mark Dowie asserts that for more than eight years following Ford's introduction of the
Pinto into the automobile market, "Ford successfully lobbied, with extraordinary vigor and some blatant lies, against a key government safety standard that would have forced the company to change
the Pinto's fire-prone gas tank." Dowie, supra note 218, at 203.
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his case by a "preponderance of the evidence," 9 or by "clear and
convincing evidence." '
My proposal is that the "external"
whistleblower should be protected only if he makes a good faith,
reasonable investigation of wrongdoing, and only where there is actual
corporate wrongdoing. This burden is sufficiently difficult for the
whistleblower and would seem to protect a company from precipitous
actions on the part of the employee. At the same time, this burden protects the public where there has been evidence of wrongdoing. As a
result, the judiciary or legislature should not erect an additional barrier
to a whistleblower such as forcing him to prove all the elements of his
cases by clear and convincing evidence.
In a whistleblowing case, the "preponderance of the evidence" rule
would seem to suffice to protect the interests of both the business and the
public. To require the whistleblower to prove the elements of his case
by clear and convincing evidence would, I fear, chill whistleblowers from
pointing out corporate wrongdoing.
Where to draw the line in the sand to protect the whistleblower
while concurrently protecting a business which has been wrongly accused
of malfeasance is line-drawing the judiciary must do.'
Simply stated,
the judiciary should carve out a public policy exception to the "at will"
employment doctrine and provide protection for the whistleblower. For
the judiciary not to step into this arena and be counted means simply that
the judiciary is fostering a dichotomy between one's moral obligations
to society and the legal system and yet the better part of jurisprudence
is for the legal system and morality to come together and bond. To do
otherwise means that the legal system has failed - for without legal
protection, whistleblowers "very often must choose between silence and
driving over a cliff. ' z Without legal protection "blowing the whistle
can be like playing Russian roulette with five or even six out of six
bullets in the cylinder." 3 It is incumbent upon the legal system "to
lower the drop from the cliff or reduce the number of bullets in the
cylinder as much as possible!"- 4

229. See Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 416 N.E.2d 557, 560 (N.Y. 1980).
230. See Ortega v. IBP Inc., 874 P.2d 1188, 1193 (Kan. 1994).
231. Cummins v. E.G. and G. Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134 (D.R.I. 1988).
232. Joseph Herkert, Management's Hat Trick: Misuse of 'Engineering Judgment' in the
ChallengerIncident, 10 J. Bus. ETics 617, 619 (1991).

233. Id. at 619.
234. Id.
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